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THE FADING OF THE POSTMODERN:
JEAN FRANCOIS LYOTARD'S
MORAUTES POSTMODERNES
At the beginning of Moralites postmodernes Lyotard inserts,
modestly towards the foot of the page, in small type, a sort of abstract or
auto-epigraph, which begins by referring to something that might have
been found at the end of the book but isn't: the moralit~, the moral, that
is used conventionally to elose a certain kind of narrative, to round out
the fable. In the course of the book there is a text in the form of a fable,
"Une fable postmoderne," aboutwhich I will be talking later on; it doesn't
have a moral either, though there is a coneluding sentence which could
almost selVe as one: "Mais, apr~s tout, cette fable ne demande pas h ~tre
crue, seulement r~fl~chie" (1993:94). Of course the whole book is a set
of morals, postmodern morals; but the moral of the book is in fact to be
found in this small pretext:
La vie va vite, aujourd'hui. Elle volatilise les moralit~s. La futilit~
convient au postmoderne, ~ la chose comme au mol. Elle n'empeche
pas qu'on se pose des quest ions, comment vivre, pourquoi? R~ponses
diff~r~es. Comme toujours, bien sOr, mais cette fois, on a I'air de le
savoir, que la vie va dans taus les sens. , Mais le sait-on? On se le
r~presente, plutOt... (1993:11).
One could spend a long time uopacking these few lines; I will
cootent myself with a very brief glosse The futility I will save for later; at
all events it does not prevent us from asking how to live, and why. A
relief, this - to find, after the eonversational relativity of postmodern
discourse, that such very basic questions, such very old questions,are alive
and weIl. The answers will be various - but they always were. We'lI still
have to wait for them - but we always did. Meanwhile life goes on after
the manner of the horseman who rode off rapidly in all directions - or
just &oes, with all the meanings we can give to that expression. It's not
that we really know any of this, but that's the way we choose to put it to
ourselves.
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This sounds Iike a familiar condition, one which people have
regularly found themselves, from time to time at least, throughout the
history of human thought. And yet "cette fois" suggests that it is
supposed to be different this time around, as though something had
happened to change the state of affairs. That it was witness to such a
change was the original conceit of postmodernism. And of course some
things have changed: there are nuclear weapons and computers, and also
AIDS and the collapse of communism, though these last happened too
late to influence the emergence of the postmodern. But then some things
always have. What comes to mind is that most banal of French clich~s,
plus 9 chan&e... I have the impression that in Moralites postmodernes
Lyotard is being driven, reluctantly, to the conclusion that it all amounts,
after aU, to la meme chose.
What postmodernism, at least of Lyotard's varietty, really did
change, temporarily at least, was the meaning of the modern - and in just
such a way as to make postmodernism seem portentous. Post- always
takes its meaning from its appropriate pre-, in Lyotard's case a story
about metanarratives. It isn't that Lyotard invented metanarratives, but
he cast them in a role that will not bear close examination. Everyone
knows the post- side of his position: "En simplifiant a I'extreme, on tient
pour 'postmoderne' l'incr~dulit~ a l'~gard des m~tar~cits" (1979:7); a
plausible reaction to it is to ask whether that isn't just what skepticism
always was? It turns out that this incredulity operated under special pre-
conditions, which are less emphasized in the literature, though they're on
the same page:
La Science est d'origine en conflit avec les ~cits. A l'aune de ses
propres crit~res, la plupart de ceux-ei se r~v~lent des fables. Mais,
pour autant qu'elle ne se r~duit pas ~ ~noncerdes ~gularites utiles et
qu'elle cherche le vrai, elle se doit de I~gitimer ses r~gles de jeu.
C'est alors qu'elle tient sur son propre statut un dicours de
I~gitimation, qui s'est appel~ philosophie. Quand ce m~tadiscours
recourt ccplicitement ~ tel ou tel grand recit, comme la dialectique de
l'Esprit, l'herm~neutiquedu sens, I'~mancipation du sujet raisonnable
ou travailleur, le d~veloppment de la richesse, on d~cide d'appeler
"modeme" la science qui s'y r~tere pour se I~gitimer (ibid.).
"On d~cide": this is the historically dubious element on which the debate
turns. The "on" is semantically dubious too; it was encountered before,
in the epigraph from Moralites postmodernes ("Ie sait-on?"), and in spite
of its disarming irnpersonality it seems to stand for a rather select and
wholly unrepresentative subculture of the microculture to which, alas, all
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of us in this room belong and which has about as much influence on
modern science as rain dances on world climate.
Who decided, and when, that the term "modern" as applied to
science should be reserved to disciplines legitimated by the great
narratives listed by Lyotard? Most of the people who have taken
themselves to be practicing or expounding modern science in the last
century or so - event if we construe "science" in the broad sense licensed
by French usa-ge - would have been rightly astonished to be told that that
description of their activities implied that their discourse was, or needed
to be, leKitimated by the dialectics of mind, or the hermeneutics of
meaning, or the liberation of the subject, or the development of wealth.
Might they all have been dependent on one or another of these
metanarratives in spite of themselves, without knowing it? It would be
hard to make this out - on the contrary, the dependence seems to go the
other way, since it was the posing of certain questions in the wake of
scientific developments that engendered these metanarratives in the first
place.
Leaving aside some ideologically motivated human scientists,
whose work would not have been considered, even by themselves,
paradigmatic of modern science, the exceptions among scientists - the
ones who might have acknowledged that they were working under the
aegis of a metanarrative - would have been the Christians and the
Marxists, striving on the one hand for the glory of God and on the other
for the future of the revolution, but even for them the metanarrative
would have had nothing directly to do with the science - it might have
been seen as inspiring but would not have been called on as legitimating.
The exceptions to that would have been on the whole, bad scientists - a
few anti-evolutionists on the Christian side in the nineteenth century, the
glaring (and as far as I know isolated) example of Lysenko on the
communist side in the twentie'lh.
It is worth hanging on to Lysenko for amoment, though, because
he suggests something about Lyotard's own relation to the modern.
There are hints in Moralites postmodernesthat postmodern incredulity-
read disillusionment - with modernist metanarratives in general may
actually be a displacement of Lyotard's own disillusionmentwith a couple
of metanarratives in particular, those of collectivism and historicism, in
short of Marxism. In "Mur, golfe, syst~me" he speaks nostalgically of "les
ann~es cinquante et soixante, alors que nous militions dans cette sorte
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d"Institut' de th~orie et de pratique qui s'appelait 'Socialisme ou
barbarie'" (1993:65), and in reflecting on the fate of the Soviet bloc
speaks of Marx as "the old hero":
Les r~gimes qui se soot pos~s aux repr~senlants du vieux h~ros n'oot
pu jouer, en soo nom, que des boufonneries sanglantes. I1s
succombenl les uns apr~s les aulres, laissant, ~ I'exception de leurs
propres cadavres, )a place vacanle pour la reconstruction des
communaut~ssur le mod~le occidental. O~ration qui prendra des
ann~es et n'ira pas sans de violentes conwlsions, on peut le craindre.
Mais ~ Iaquelle on ne voit rien qui puisse r~sister (1993:70).
French philosophy has always been obliged, as Anglo-American
philosophy has not, to put Marxism somewhere near center stage, as a
presence to be reckoned with. The specifically American story that
consigned it for so long to the wings is a shameful one, but this
transatlantic difference has sometimes produced amusing or even
poignant moments for philosophers in America who folIowand have
affection for things French.
In the middle seventies many of us, myself included, were finally
succeeding in getting American students to read Marx seriously as the
great philosopher he is. This was just the moment at which the nouveaux
philosophes came on a cultural mission to America with their new
evangelism, the burden of which was: it is no longer necessary to read
Marx. This alarmed the French Marxists, who sent over a one-man
damage control team in the person of the great Henri Lefebvre at a
private meeting in New York, and it was hard to keep a straight face: he
rehearsed all the old Party clich~s as if we were an audience from the
HLM's at some maison de culture in the Paris suburbs.
The apparent triumph of Western democratic capitalism since
1989 has not seemed to some of us here as extraordinary as it seems to
intellectuals like Lyotard - or, let us say, it has not seemed extraordinary
in the same way. We have lived under what Lyotard calls simply "Ie
syst~me" for years without (except for a few heady moments in the late
sixties) the ever-present lure, or even hope, represented by Marxism.
Having known something about the alternative, and now discredited,
system we were not surprised at its collapse, though we may have been
surprised that it happened so soon and so fast; never having bought its
metanarrative, having indeed been living all along in a culture that had
no consistent metanarrative, we did not have to learn incredulity.
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I come, then, but by a somewhat düferent route from his, to a
conclusion similar to Bruno Latour's: we never were modern, at least not
in the special sense against which Lyotard's version of postmodernism
defines itself. Perhaps this puts it too strongly: the historicizing and
oollectivizing tendency has not been absent on this side of the Atlantic,
in one form or another. It sometimes seems to me that Western
philosophy went off on a two-hundred year detour - say from 1789 to
1989 - during which it was seduced by universal history and by the notion
of the socially-constructed individual to the point of a general softening
of the brain. It is surely not accidental that these two centuries also saw
the rise and fall of imperialism. Since 1989 it has been understandable
for everyone to think, as Lyotard puts it, that "le grand rtcit des Lumi~res
I'a finalement emport~ sur les repr~sentations de I'Homme de l'histoire
qui ont brigu~, contre lui, la direction th~orique et pratique des affaires
humaines" (1993:68). We cannot, perhaps, simply resumelhe eighteenth-
century program, but it is my personal view that the single figure whose
example and inspiration we most need at the moment is Voltaire.
I might mention in passing - though it would lead off in quite a
different direction - how already two hundred years ago Voltaire was
undertaking something that few of us seem to feellike tackling, though
it badly needs to be tackled, namely the philosophical critique of Islam;
that he did it, as was habitual with hirn, in the mode of satire, does not
detract from its seriousness. We have the opportunity now to do things
in a more hard-brained manner, coming to terms with the absolute
idiosyncrasy of the embodied human subject, which enables and has
always enabled the individual to stand apart from the dominant
metanarratives of his or her time. That it seems to me is a good way for
postmodernism to coexist with its relative modern, as the critical wing of
the avant-garde. But this works only if we admit that it was around long
enough before modernism was thought of. On this showing, for example,
Socrates in the Phaedrus is an exemplary postmodern.
Lyotard seems to agree about the current signüicance of Islam,
and about Voltaire, whom he says he would like to be imitating - "au
talent pr~s" - in the postmodern fable that follows "Mur, golfe, syst~me"
in Moralit~ postmodernes. This juxtaposition of texts is one of the most
interesting in the whole book. The former is a brilliant summary of the
way the contemporary world looked in the light of the impending Gulf
war (was written in late 1990); the latter is an elegant evocation of the
situation of the human race on a small planet in the solar system halfway
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through the lüe cycle of the Sun, and its eventual prospects of escape
form the impending destruction of the system when, billions of years
hence, the Sun finaUy becomes a nova. About this fable Lyotard says
that it is not at a1l critical, that it is frankly "representative," that it is
referential ralher than reflexive, hence naive, even puerile. Why then,
given that it falls postmodern inspiration at so many points, would a good
postmodernist bother to tell it at all? Here is Lyotard's reply:
J'aurais pour C"JCcuse que mon histoire est passablement accr~dit~e
dans des milieux fort s~rieux, physiciens, biologistes, ~conomistes. De
fa~on certes informelle, voire craintive, comme si cette fable ~tait le
reve inavouable que le monde postmoderne reve ~ propos de lui-
meme. Un conte qui serait, en samme, le grand ~cit que ce monde
s'obstine l raconter sur lui-meme apr~s que les grands r~cits ont
~videmment fait faillite (1993:77).
And what is this fable after aD? straight modern science -
modern in the old sense and not subordinate to any of Lyotard's meta-
narratives - plus a bit of science fiction. (The appeal to "des milieux fort
s~rieux" would seem in this case 10 be using the modern to legitimate the
postmodern.) We have some billions of years before the crunch, and who
knows what Man and his Brain (or Brain and its Man) will have become
by then, and whether He or It will escape in time to other parts of the
cosmos? The main outlines of this story have been available, and re-
peated time and again, ever since astrophysics began to be a developed
science, and thinking about it has always required a sense of proportion.
The span of life on earth, from macromolecules to ineineration, can be
estimated at roughly ten billion years, of which five may be still to go;
human beings like us have been around for a million years (a generous
estimate in fact), civilization for perhaps ten or twenty thousand, science
in its modern form for three or four hundred. Consider what informed
futurologists thought, only fifty years ago, the world would be like today,
and how wildly off they were; consider in that light what conjectures on
our part about very much longer timespans can possibly amount to. A
story used to circulate of a member of the audience who came up to the
lecturer after a talk on cosmology and asked in a trembling voice: "Did
you say the earth would go up in flames in five million years' time?"
"No," replied the lecturer, "I said five billion." "Thank God!" said the
questioner.
So Lyotard's fable seems to represent his rather delayed
discovery of what the rest of us have always thought of as modern
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science. True, its quasi-moral, as I remarked earlier, is that it is not to
be believed, only reßected upon. And he does acknowledge that it is
neither recent nor original:
Mais je la pretends postmoderne. Postmoderne ne signifie pas recent.
11 signifie comment I'~criture, au sens plus large de la pen~e et de
I'action, se situe apres qu'elle a subi la contagion de la modemit~ et
qu'elle a tent~ de s'en gu~rir (1993:89).
But now it turns out that modernity isn't recent either, it goes back to SI.
Paul and SI. Augustine, which according to the metanarrative theory it
probably does, though there wasn't much science, even in the broadest
sense, to be legitimated by their metanarrative at the time.
It is hard at this point to resist the feeling that the whole
modern/postmoderncontrast is being somewhat stretched, and that of the
two senses of "modern," the one that lends itself to the by now
conventional defmition of the postmodern and the one that doesn't, the
latter is beginning to take over. This feeling is reinforced elsewhere in
Lyotard's book, for example in the very interesting essay on Malraux.
Consider the following passage:
Le mus~e imaginaire ne peut ~tre que "modeme". 11 raut en erret que
la civilisation dans laquelle iI apparAit ait perdu toute croyance pour
qu'elle puisse accueillir les objets de toutes les croyances sans les juger
stupides, barabares, inaccessibles...(1993:154).
What is the loss of all belief if not that very incredulity which is supposed
to be the mark of the postmodern? and what is the museum in the
imagination if not the realization of the multicultural convergence which
is one of its more welcome concomitants? Yet they appear here under
the guise of the modern.
ünce again, though, it is the old modern, not the new one against
which the postmodern was originally set off. And once again the
opposition which Lyotard then produces, as postmodern to this modern,
is itself an old opposition that did not have to wait for postmodernity in
order to manifest itself. For he fears that the monumentality of the
museum, real or imaginary, will lead to an "establishment" which, by
seducing artists into doing what will get themselves accepted by it rather
than what their freedom impels them to do, "exercerait une menace
mortelle sur I'art" (1993:157). But surely this menace and its antidote
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have been in play ever since the Academy was first challenged by the
salon des refus~s.
There might be much more along these lines. Lyotard in this
book is Protean, sometimes brilliant, nearly always interesting, often
infuriating. Some of the unreality that reigns in the postmodernist chapel,
and not only among literary or philosophical figures - sociologists and
economists often fall for it too - is to be found in the early pieces about
cultural capital and the metaphor of the city, or rather of its "zone," its
dehumanized inner suburbs. In "Zone" we find, for example, that "Ie
corps producteur est d~ja un archaisme" (1993:28). Lyotard is fond of
sweeping aphorisms like this, but they rarely hold up. The idea that there
can be an economy of information without physical work has become a
popular delusion, but while 'the replacement of labor power by machinery
in large-scale production is a reality, the dream of machines that run
machines, leaving humans to deal in pure information, is cut from the
same cloth as teleportation or the warp drive. There is a lot of
information about, and it does produce interesting anomalies, but we
aren't that postmodern yet and won't be for a long time.
The cultural capital chapter, "Marie au Japon," is a wonderful
and very witty evocation of globetrotting academic fashion, almost in the
style of David Lodge. But it also has an unmistakable echo of Andy
Warhol: Marie, in her microcosm, is having her fifteen minutes of farne,
but the futility with which I began and to which I promised to return
permeates the essay - the very one Lyotard has chosen to lead this
collection. What, as the postmodern fable unfolds - not on the scale of
billions of years, not even on the scale of thousands or of hundreds, but
let's say decades: the year 2018 perhaps, a quarter of a century from now
- will remain of postmodern? Perhaps the futility of the postmodern lies
in its having becomes a metanarrative in its own right, ready in its turn
to be deconstructed by the incredulity of its successors. We can't keep
having these IittIe historicist dramas, in which fashion follows fashion, and
expect to be remerrlbered by the enthusiasts of the fashion after next.
Not that I would wish to take the totalitarian view of someone
like Pierre Nora, whose proposal for ending intellectual squabbles
Lyotard describes in "Intime est la terreur," one of the best pieces in the
book and one with which I am in complete sympathy. But here
postmodernism is so far forgotten that Lyotard evokes the lonely creatol'
as the unassimilable exception to every movement of ideas; "devant la
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toile ou la page, le consensus est nul et non avenu" (1993: 184). And one
says to oneself: that's it! that's been it aD along: incredulity about
metanarratives doesn't belong to an epoch or a movement, it belongs and
has always belonged to the free individual, outside of history, who will
oontinue to pose the questions How to live? and why? and for whom
therefore, and thanks to whom, life will continue to be interesting as long
as the fable lasts. If only Lyotard could have beKun there.
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